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Full text of "Rapid Population Growth Consequences And Policy Implications"

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ement effect, we do not imply that a 0 percent population attempt to increase its rate of growth to reach the 3 percent nclusion is that, other things equal, a population growing at 3 .ave a temporary advantage over a population growing at 0 ms of a positive replacement effect, but this advantage cannot y a gradual increase in the rate of growth of a slower or non-ation. It simply implies that the more rapidly growing popula-sitive aspect which counteracts the negative aspects of rapid mt this aspect is less significant in the slow-growing population, not the replacement effect is of interest depends on the ac-the assumptions, especially with respect to the assumptions: (a) ; of education are consumption costs rather than investment that the level of education per person provided for later en-than earlier entrants) is unaffected (or less than proportionately >ositive rates of population growth. We do not have the space 2r all the possibilities.
•tant qualifications must be made in considering the replace-'irst, the replacement effect may be negative as well as positive, s, if the demographic effects considered in the previous sections :nse transmitted from one generation to the next, then a more •eplacement may lower the acquired economic qualities of such Second, it must, of course, be remembered that even the posi-:nt effect must be considered as only one element among many of which probably inhibit economic growth. The positive reset is delineated primarily in the interest of achieving a balanced :ie question of assessing the consequences of population growth.
Gingrich have developed a model in which practically no advantage is basis of the replacement effect by a population increasing its rate of y. Sec (31).traditional inputs. Many of the nontraditional inputs have an elusive quality about them. They cannot be handled from an analytical viewpoint as easily as the traditional ones. The basic conjecture of this paper is that the assumption of a one-to-one correspondence between inputs and outputs is no longer tenable once one gives primary importance to nontraditional inputs. What is new is the rather persuasive evidence that the nontraditional inputs are usually more significant than the traditional ones, and hence the relations between population growth and nontraditional inputs should in most cases become central to the analysis of the "population-resources" problem.